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BEGINNING THE ENDGAME:
THE SEARCH FOR AN INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM
ALTERNATIVE TO TORT LIABILITY FOR TOBACCO-RELATED HARMS

by Paul A. LeBel*
The reference to an endgame in the title of this contribution to
the Symposium is meant to sound both an optimistic and a pessimistic note. The good news, one might argue, is that the key
policy makers of our society have begun to think seriously about
the many ramifications of a more widespread and detailed appreciation of the relationship between the use of tobacco products
and the resultant adverse effects on health. The bad news is that
as we are poised to engage in the endgame, much of our thought
seems to be confined within the molds that offer little promise
for arriving at the most socially responsible outcome to that
game.
Legal developments in the safety and liability portions of the
tobacco arena are currently progressing on six fronts. 1 In litigation to impose liability on members of the industry, there are
claims to recover damages for harm to smokers as individual
litigants and as members of classes of smokers, 2 claims to recover damages for harm attributable to exposure to environmental (or ·second-hand) tobacco smoke, 3 and claims by public authorities to recover the costs of publicly funded health care for
tobacco-related health problems. 4 On the regulatory front, there
are efforts at the federal, state, and local levels to control access

• James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Stephanie Zapata.
1. Paul A. LeBel, "Of Deaths Put On By Cunning and Forced Cause": Reality
Bites The Tobacco Industry, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 615-33 (1997) (hereinafter
cited as Tobacco Deaths). Criminal investigations are also proceeding at state and
federal levels, but those are beyond the scope of this article, except to the extent
that they might serve as a source of additional information about the industry and
of additional pressure to reach closure on some of the outstanding safety and ~iability
issues.
2. !d. at 618-23.
3. !d. at 625-26.
4. !d. at 626-29.
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to tobacco products, 5 to expand the information that is available
about those products, 6 and (to a considerably lesser extent) to
affect the content of tobacco products. 7
With the exception of the innovative use of Medicaid subrogation claims by the state attorneys general in nearly half of the
states, the litigation strategies that are being used involve efforts to shape standard tort doctrines and procedural devices to
fit the demands of the tobacco context. 8 Assuming that the substantive elements and the procedures can be made to accommodate liability for harm - in this case, harm caused by a product
that is more accurately characterized as lethal rather than as
defective - it is not at all clear that the public interest is best
served by transferring great amounts of wealth from the tobacco
industry to smokers and their heirs. 9 The daunting prospect of
adjudicating tobacco tort claims by the hundreds of thousands
calls into question whether we are capable of learning anything
from the experience of mass injury litigation in such settings as
asbestos, Bendectin, and silicone gel breast implants claims.
On the regulatory front, even the more robust regulatory strategies for tobacco are distinctive for their refusal to follow
through on the full implications of the lethal and addictive nature of the products. If nicotine is an addictive drug, 10 and if it
is delivered to consumers in a carcinogenic and cardiopulmonary
risky manner, 11 then the cautionary approach by the regulatory
agencies is more a testament to the political realities than it is
evidence of a principled consistency in regulatory concern. 12 We

5. Jd. at 631-33.
6. Id. at 629-31.
7. Jd. at 633.
8. Professor Eades' commentary in this Symposium -offers a powerful critique of
the use of tort remedies in this setting. Ronald W. Eades, A Comment on Professor
Paul A. LeBel's Ideas for a Tobacco Injuries Compensation System, 24 N. KY. L. REV.
495 (1997).
9. The most cogent and compelling articulation of this skepticism has been put
forward by Stanford Professor Robert Rabin. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of
the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 876-78 (1992).
10. The Food and Drug Administration has concluded that it is addictive. 61 FED.
REG. 44,661 (1996).
11. The versions of the federally mandated warnings in effect since 1984 are
unambiguous on this point. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994).
12. Professor O'Reilly's contribution to this symposium makes a compelling argument for the proposition that the agency is not required to go farther and faster
than it has. James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why FDA
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have entered into the endgame, one might conclude, but we seem
to be resigned to playing by using the questionable moves of the
conventional model of tort liability and a deferential approach to
an industry that still possesses considerable political influence.
The principal papers and commentaries presented in this Symposium offer many insightful views of quite distinguished people
whose thoughts on tobacco litigation and regulation will advance
the public debate and the legal understanding on this significant
topic. My own views are deeply sympathetic on a number of
levels to those who are advocating an enhanced liability exposure
for the tobacco industry and to those who are supporting both
the federal regulatory regime about to go into place and some
even more robust efforts by states and municipalities on disclosure and on use. 13 Nevertheless, and I hope not just to be
contrarian, I propose to come at the current posture of the legal
relationship between the nation's health and the tobacco industry from a different perspective. Instead of beginning with the
litigation and regulatory models and working out the conceptual
and the practical difficulties of applying them to the tobaccorelated harm problem, I will start with the notion that thinking
at the systemic level about injury compensation can lead us
toward an approach that, if not superior to current paradigms,
will at least help to inform the debate about the next round of
legal responses to the problem.
This is admittedly not the first effort at devising a compensation program for tobacco-related harms. For at least two decades,
legal scholars have reacted to concerns about the appropriateness of tort remedies in the cigarette context by offering suggestions for creating an alternative method of resolving those claims
and of lowering the incidence of harm associated with the products. 14 This occasion for looking anew at the possibility of con-

Will Prevail After The Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 509 (1997).
13. More specifically, I think that Professor Wertheimer is quite convincing when
she argues that tobacco products are susceptible to the application of traditional and
modern concepts of products liability. Ellen Wertheimer, Pandora's Humidor: Tobacco
Producer Liability in Tort, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 397 (1997). My concern is what follows
from that liability. In a real sense, then, my concern is not that we cannot make a
case for liability, it is that we can.
14. Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1990); Donald W. Garner,
Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 (1977).
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structing a compensation system for tobacco-related harms is the
result of the convergence of three developments: first, a growing
body of federal and state experience with compensation programs
in other settings; second, a sense of frustration that the lessons
of such mass tort litigation experiences as the asbestos cases are
having such little impact on the planning for the resolution of
the tobacco injury problem; and third, a belief that the disclosure
of the internal workings of the tobacco industry will prompt a
call for serious action sooner rather than later. For those reasons, the time is ripe for investing in a proactive approach to
sketching the contours of an injury compensation for tobaccorelated harms.
The ways in which a society deals with its citizens who have
suffered injuries because of exposure to external sources of risk
can be a telling indicator of the notions of justice that prevail in
that society. 15 Injuries can be viewed as occasions for applying
notions of corrective justice, returning the victims as close as we
can to the status quo ante, or they can be seen as opportunities
for engaging in a more sweeping exercise in distributive justice,
using the intervention in the post-accident setting as an occasion
for redressing other inequalities. 16 Accidental harm can evoke
communitarian principles, under which the burden of dealing
with the consequences of the harm is spread over a wide base, 17
or it can be seen as a matter for the injury victim to deal with
under a more atomistic view of the person as an isolated unit,
with strongly individualistic notions of personal responsibility
and of culpability providing the critical concepts underlying a
scheme for allocating losses. 18
When one examines the multiple techniques of providing compensation for injury in this society at the end of this millennium,
one gets a perhaps unintended but probably quite accurate sense
of the philosophical pluralism, if not muddle, that underlies a
significant segment of American law and public policy. Compensation for harm is accomplished through a wide variety of tech15. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, ed., PIDLOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF.TORT LAW
(1995).
16. Tony Honore, The Morality of Tort Law - Questions and Answers, in OWEN,
id. at 78-90.
17. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power, cind Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (1990).
18. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77-163 (1881).
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niques and mechanisms, some created by legislative intervention
and others produced through the accretion of a centuries-long
common law decision making process. Against that background,
it is more appropriate to think of looking at multiple systems
from which guidance might be sought in addressing a particular
injury problem, than it is to think that one can identify a single
organizing principle. 19
The driving force behind this article is a belief that the current situation with regard to tobacco-related harms offers an
occasion for devising an injury compensation system that should
be better able to accommodate the specific demands created by
that situation than we would obtain by manipulating tort doctrines or by exercising reg\llatory authority that would likely be
met with considerable political resistance that could produce a
backlash that impacts other vitally important regulatory initiatives and liability doctrines. Such a system will be shown to
deviate from our conventional understanding of tort law remedies in substantial ways. 20 Indeed, labeling an approach as a
search for an optimum injury compensation system implies in
the present day terminology that one is looking for an alternative or a supplement to a traditional tort litigation model of
providing compensation.
In its broadest usage, the term "injury compensation systems"
should encompass the full range of programs and mechanisms
that can provide compensation to injured people. The oldest of
the injury compensation systems in our legal heritage was what
we would now describe as a first-party process, in which the
injured person was generally required to draw on his or her own
resources, including in many instances a network of extended
family and charitable resources, to alleviate the consequences of
a harm.
By the middle of the Nineteenth Century, a general body of

19. See lzhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 27, 68 (1980) (characterizing the attempts in
"modern American scholarship in response to the crisis in tort law . . . to fashion an
improved general theory of liability" as "doomed to failure").
20. A previous exercise along these lines in the drunk driving accident setting is
PAUL A. LEBEL, JOHN BARLEYCORN MUST PAY: COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF
DRINKING DRIVERS (1992). The problem posed by second-hand smoke was alluded to
in that work as potentially susceptible to a compensation system solution. Jd. at 33134.
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tort law rules and principles had taken shape and assumed a
growing significance as a system for the allocation of at least
some losses from the victim to those whose conduct was responsible (usually their negligent conduct) for contributing to the
harm. The compensation that was obtainable under these traditional tort rules tended to reflect a number of doctrinal features:
(a) the ability to characterize as negligent (or even more highly
culpable) the conduct of the person from whom compensation
was sought; (b) the identification of a quite specific and
particularistic causal relationship between that fault and the
harm for which compensation was sought; (c) an ability to characterize the injured person as being close to innocent in the
production of the harm; (d) a skeptical attitude toward harm
that was not tangible; (e) a process of determining legal responsibility that required individual adjudication of the issues in controversy; and (0 placement on the party seeking to relieve the
burdens of production of legally sufficient evidence and persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Twentieth Century has seen an expansion, and more
recently some contraction as well, in the scope of tort law as an
injury compensation system. Strict liability has emerged as a
viable theory of responsibility in some significant injury contexts.
While strict liability in its modern incarnation was initially
thought to be appropriate in the case of the most dangerous
activities, 21 liability that was not ostensibly based on fault enjoyed a three decade expansion in the realm of products liability
claims. 22 Recent developments in that field, however, reflect a
considerable retreat from the full implications of applying truly
strict liability in all but the simplest of product injury cases. 23
More attenuated connections to an individual's harm have supported legal responsibility in a few exceptional situations. 24
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 {1977) {translating the "unsuccessful containment" idea of Rylands v. Fletcher into a contemporary principle of
liability for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities).
22. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A {1965).
23. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILI'IY {Proposed Official Draft
1997).
24. The innovative approaches taken in a few of the DES cases stretch the individual causation element well beyond its traditional shape. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 607 P.2d 924 {Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 {1980) {initial adoption of market share theory of liability); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 {Wis. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (risk contribution theory of liability); Hymowitz v.
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Comparative responsibility has flourished as a replacement for
the traditional notion of tort .liability as an ali-or-nothing proposition.25 The legal system has shown a greater willingness to
consider harms other than readily apparent physical injury as
deserving of compensation. 26 In some instances, resolution of
tort claims on a basis other than case-by-case adjudication has
been approved, 27 although again recent developments suggest a
growing reluctance to consider such adjudicatory methods as
appropriate in the settings where they might have the most
significant impact. 28 Finally, the burdens of production and persuasion have been eased for plaintiffs in some situations or imposed on defendants after a relatively minimal showing by plaintiffs.29
Althougli the extensive modification of traditional tort law has
been a significant part of the compensation picture of the last
fifty years, the most noteworthy injury compensation development in this century has been the introduction of a number of
legislative compensation schemes that treat some types of inju-.
ries to individuals as problems that require more of a social

Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (furthest reach of market share theory, refusing to allow manufacturers of DES to exculpate themselves by disproving possibiliV of having caused the particular plaintiffs
harm).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (Council Draft
No. 1 1996).
26. See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognition of claim for damages for fear of developing cancer from exposure to asbestos);
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hasps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim recognized for misdiagnosis of spouse with sexually transmitted
disease).
27. See, e.g., In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (fairness opinion approving class settlement of claims that would have been
unable to establish basis of liability as individual claims).
28. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting class certification for determination of some common liability issues in nationwide tobacco litigation); Georgine v. Amchem ]>rods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996) (rejecting class certification for settlement purposes in
asbestos litigation).
29. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.. 1978) (permitting plaintiff in design defect litigation to make minimal showing of causal relationship between design feature and harm, and then imposing burden of justification of that design feature on defendant); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (imposing on pharmaceutical company the burden of proving that knowledge of the risk
of a prescription drug was not within the scientific state of the art at the time of
distribution).
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solution than is likely to be obtained in the tort system. 30 The
most significant of these alternative and supplemental compensation programs - the workers' compensation systems at the
state and federal levels- traces its roots to Nineteenth Century
Europe, and has been well established in the United States since
the second decade of this century. In recent years, compensation
programs have proliferated as legislatures have sought to divert
categories of harms from being adjudicated by the tort litigation
process. 31 In a development that may be somewhat more surprising, courts in the mass injury setting have now entered into
the process of compensation program creation, utilizing a variety
of procedural vehicles such as class action settlements, 32 and
jurisdictional devices such as bankruptcy reorganization plan
approval, 33 to accomplish that goal.
As we approach the Twenty-first Century, the phenomenon of
an injury compensation program that acts as an alternative or a
supplement to traditional tort liability has assumed a newly
vigorous role. The most useful conceptual underpinnings of an
effort to construct an innovative compensation program are likely to be found in the three-quarters of a century experience in
providing compensation for workplace harm under the workers'
compensation systems adopted in each of the states. That experience offers a significant insight both into the nature of the issues
that are raised by compensating for injuries outside of the traditional tort arena and into the feasible contours of the resolutions
of those issues. A good deal of the narrowly-focused injury compensation program legislation in recent years draws from the
workers' compensation experience, in both positive (benefiting

30. These systems are qualitatively different from no-fault insurance legislation,
which have the effect of treating harms as purely private insurance matters rather
than as requiring a social solution.
31. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10-300aa-34 (1994) (National Childhood Vaccine
IJ\jury Compensation Act); FLA. STAT. §§ 766.301-766.316 (1988) (Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000-38.2-5021 (Michie 1994)
(Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Il\iury Compensation Act).
32. See, e.g., In Re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12521 (M.D. Ala. 1994). A revised settlement had to be fashioned after
the bankruptcy petition by Dow Corning changed the amount and the sources of the
funding available.
33. See, e.g., In Re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989) (upholding central elements of district court approval of reorganization plan establishing compensation program for victims of Dalkon Shield).
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from the lessons in workers' compensation) and negative (failing
to break through the confines of that experience) ways. The most
recent of the significant conceptual advances in the law of injury
compensation today occurs in the judicial arena, and one can
take advantage of those developments as well by drawing on the
experiences of the end-stage of the most innovative mass tort
litigation to expand the range of options that one can put on the
table when confronted with a new (or newly addressed) injury
compensation problem.
A good deal of the innovation in the law of injury compensation in the last quarter-century has appeared to operate from the
premise that specific inadequacies of traditional tort law can be
remedied by a more or less radical departure from the tort litigation model. Too many of these systems, however, particularly
those that have been created through the judicial process, seem
to be engaged in re-inventing the wheel. In a sense, the injury
compensation system creative process appears mainly to have
looked vertically to the tort model, and seems to have had as its
primary focus an attempt to avoid the more unsatisfactory features of that model.
The search for an optimum compensation system would benefit from the introduction of a different perspective on the developments in this area of law and policy. Such a search would look
horizontally across the range of legislative and judicial compensation systems to identify the lessons that can be learned from
the experience of other systems and that can then be extended to
this new context if it is thought to be suitable for some deviation
from a tort litigation vehicle for injury compensation.
I. THE GOALS AND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN
INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM

The developing law of injury compensation systems is one of
the most explicitly instrumental bodies of rules and processes in
American jurisprudence. Legislatures and courts are generally
inclined to turn to a search for an injury compensation system
only when some significant problem is perceived with the ability
of traditional tort litigation to accomplish its function of providing appropriate levels of compensation to those who legitimately
deserve to be compensated. An important part of understanding
this body of law, then, consists of an appreciation of when and
why case-by-case litigation of individual tort claims is thought to
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be inadequate. The starting point for the crafting of most of the
programs currently in place thus seems to be an examination of
what was occurring in the tort arena's disposition of claims arising from these injuries and an exploration of what were thought
to be the drawbacks to that disposition. For that reason, the
initial decision to move in the direction of an injury compensation system and the shape of the system that is constructed each
might be characterized as responsive or reactive to a disappointment with the operation of the tort system.
Equally important in the development of an injury compensation system as the sense of when a resort to tort law falls short,
however, is an explicit identification of what an injury compensation system can hope to accomplish. It is only when the goals are
known and the possible- tensions among them are appreciated
that it is possible to make informed policy choices about how to
structure a particular compensation program. Although there
can be differences of opinion about the terminology to describe
and the priority to assign to them, 34 the goals of an injury compensation system can usefully be understood as occupying four
distinct categories: the compensation for loss, the enhancement
of safety, the achievement of administrative efficiency, and the
imposition of an appropriate internalization of injury costs.

34. A recent study of the Federal Employers' Liability Act offered the following
statement of the goals of an injury compensation system:
Overall goals of injury compensation involve equity, efficiency, and incentives.
Ideally, an injury compensation system should be equitable to the injured
worker, should provide benefits in an efficient manner, and should be structured so that each party has incentives to reduce both injuries and the costs of
those injuries that occur. . . .
A system's efficiency and incentive structure can be assessed objectively, but
the fairness of any particular system depends on more subjective perspectives
or social philosophies of individuals or groups. The criteria that may be considered in judging the fairness of a particular injury compensation system, however, can be defined and investigated. They include the extent of coverage, including who and what is compensated; the level of the compensation for losses;
the speed with which the losses are compensated; the certainty with which
they are compensated; and who bears the costs of compensation.
Transportation Research Board, COMPENSATING INJURED RAILROAD WORKERS
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 4 (1994).
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A. The First Goal - Compensation for Loss

To compensate for an injury is to take steps to offset the adverse consequences attributable to the injury. Unlike the case in
such legal regimes as property and contracts, the nature of the
harm addressed by tort law generally does not lend itself to remedies that restore the aggrieved person to the original state before the other person interfered with her or his rights. For the
most part, our legal system accomplishes a compensatory function in the tort arena by requiring a party to make a monetary
pay~ent to the injured person or to someone who has incurred
an expense or suffered a loss because of the injury to the victim.
Similar limitations in the ability to restore the injury victim to
a pre-injury status exist when one resorts to a compensation system outside of the tort arena. Perhaps the greatest advantage of
an injury compensation system is the ability to focus attention
and direct funds that anticipate and alleviate the impact of prospective harms, as opposed to the predominantly retrospective
focus of the tort liability system. Compensation programs can be
constructed in particular contexts recognizing that some of the
population will certainly be adversely affected in the future, and
that some of those who are injured will certainly continue to
incur losses after the initial injury. An injury compensation system enables a society and its legal system to get ahead of the
curve instead of continually playing catch-up in addressing an ·
injury problem.
Compensation can be structured to cover a variety of losses,
and it can extend to a range of people who are related to the
victim in different ways. Major distinctions can be drawn among
the types of compensation to highlight the options in choosing
which of multiple compensatory goals are realistically achievable
in a particular context.
The basic theoretical distinction in compensation is between
direct and indirect costs of injury. 35 Within the category of direct costs we find such items of loss as physical harm suffered in
an incident, loss of income due to the inability to work, physical
pain and suffering, and mental or emotional harm. Indirect costs

35. Judge Calabresi characterizes this distinction as one between "primary" and
"secondary" accident costs. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-28 (1970).
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of injury include such matters as the loss of economic support to
those who depend on the flow of income supplied by the injured
party, loss of emotional support that would have been provided
by the victim, and loss of companionship or consortium as a result of the injury. A rough counterpart of this distinction within
traditional tort doctrine would be a distinction between claims by
the victim of the tortious conduct and derivative claims that flow
from a relationship to that victim.
· The characteristic feature of injury compensation systems
created by legislatures is their tendency to restrict compensation
to pecuniary losses. The largest system, workers' compensation,
typically limits benefits to medical and rehabilitation expenses
incurred as a result of a workplace injury or occupational disease, a partial replacement of wage loss during periods of disability due to that injury or disease, and death benefits to those
who are actually dependent on the deceased worker. The state
programs to replace the part of the medical malpractice system
that would otherwise apply in birth-related neurological injury
incidents similarly exclude non-pecuniary loss from the compensation that is provided. 36 One of the compelling justifications for
restricting compensation in this way has to be the recognition
that when limited funds are available, the highest priority use of
the funds is to alleviate the consequences of the injury that are
most likely to produce disadvantageous social effects, as the
victim's personal resources would have to be diverted from their
other beneficial uses and devoted to dealing with the harm.
The federal childhood vaccine injury compensation program is
distinctive among injury compensation systems in its allowance
of recovery for pain and suffering, with that recovery capped at
$250,000. 37 That compensation program has an opt-out provision, giving the vaccine injury victim an election to pursue a tort
remedy following exhaustion of the statutory process, 38 and is
thus distinguishable from the exclusivity model that is common
to most other compensation systems. Allowing recovery for pain
and suffering, even if modest in amount by comparison to tort re-

36. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009 (Michie 1994) (authorizing compensation
for actual medically necessary and reasonable care expenses, lost earnings, and the
expenses of obtaining compensation).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(4) (1994).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a) (1994).

1997]

BEGINNING THE ENDGAME

469

covery standards, could play an important role in reducing the
disincentive to accept the award decision that has been made
within the compensation program. This would in turn lower the
social costs of operating a compensation program and a tort
litigation system for resolving the same claims.
Because the relevant comparison when creating most injury
compensation systems is to the tort liability system, there are
limits on how much of a variation can exist between tort compensation and the benefits available under the new system. Too
large a difference can raise concerns about depriving potential
tort litigants of a remedy without providing some corresponding
gain. If the difference narrows too much, however, one might
question what is achieved by the creation of the new system.
For the broad-scale social contract arrangement of the
workers' compensation systems, the trade-off metaphor offers a
realistic and comforting image. Both categories of parties to the
contract - employers and employees - receive and give up
something of value under the system, with the public interest
being served as well by the diversion of workplace harms into a
compensation system that provides swifter and surer compensation at a lower expense than would be true within the tort system.
For the more narrowly tailored compensation programs of
recent vintage, the smallest levels of benefits that are available
tend to be found in the programs in which the likelihood of receiving any compensation in the tort system is lowest. Agent
Orange victims who would have been unable to establish causa,;.
tion on an individual basis thus were able to get quite modest
payments under a compensation program that awarded relief to
the class of people who were exposed to the herbicide. 39 Similarly, the divergence between the size of tort awards and the benefits available in the compensation program established for
Dalkon Shield victims as part of the A H. Robins bankruptcy
reorganization plan were greatest for the class of claimants who
proved none of the elements that would have been necessary had
they pursued a tort remedy. 40 In contrast, those claimants who

39. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
CoURTS 220·21 (1986).

40. Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or
Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 630-34 (1992).
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were thought to have the most viable tort claims were treated (in
theory, at least) as if they would be given their full measure of
tort damages from the compensation program. 41
B. The Second Goal - Safety Enhancement
The first-order justification for a compensation program is its
delivery of funds to people whose i:qjuries have left them or their
dependents at some disadvantage. As such, a program that operated only with a corrective or distributive aim could still be justified by pointing to its ability to reach that first-order goal. The
case for a compensation program is likely to be strengthened,
however, if it can be shown to have a positive effect in enhancing
safety by reducing the frequency or the severity of injuries.
Probably the most effective way of achieving a safety goal is
action that is directed at the injury-producing conduct. Regulation of workplace practices42 and consumer product bans43 are
examples of this sort of safety-related action, as are the setting
of highway speed limits44 and the installation of occupant protection systems in automobiles. 45 This kind of "specific deterrence"46 of risks of harm requires a level of understanding of
the magnitude of the injury problem and the contributions of the
various factors that play a role in its size and severity that is
often difficult if not impossible to appreciate until the problem
has blossomed into a social and legal crisis. In a real sense, then,
the legal decision maker who anticipates a risk but is unsure of
how best to address it through direct regulation is encountering .
an open-textured situation characterized by the handicaps identified by Herbert Hart as associated with the legal authority who
would prefer to govern through pre-announced rules: "relative
ignorance of fact ... [and] relative indeterminacy of aim." 47 The

41. /d. at 636-46.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994) (Occupational Safety and Health Act).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1994) (Consumer Product Safety Commission ban of consumer products).
44. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-870 (Michie 1994) (setting of speed limit).
45. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1994) (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for occupant protection systems).
46. The term is Calabresi's, and is used to distinguish the direct effect of regulation from the indirect effect of exposure to liability, referred to as "general deterrence." CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 95.
47. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961).

1997]

BEGINNING THE ENDGAME

471

striking feature of the world in which people suffer injury is that
events require decisions to be made after the fact about which
there was prior ignorance and when the indeterminate aim to
avoid harm could not realistically have been accomplished.
In contrast to the use of direct regulatory action to avoid
· harm, injury compensation programs produce their safety effects
indirectly, if at all. Compensation obligations force an entity that
might otherwise be legally and financially indifferent to the consequences of its action to take into account the accident costs for
which it will be held responsible. Employers who are liable for
workers' compensation benefits for injuries that entail no realistic exposure to tort liability are thus unable to be legally indifferent to those harms, and they may respond to that workers' compensation obligation by taking steps to lower the risk of harm.
Compensation obligations may also induce a previously insufficiently interested third party to become involved in making decisions for safety. To use the workplace setting again, the contractual obligation to indemnify the employer for its workers' compensation liability can induce the workers' compensation insurance carrier to take two steps that would be expected to increase
safety. First, it can tailor insurance premiums to the risk that
the employer is actually posing to its work force, and second, it
can conduct an inspection program to recommend or demand
changes in work practices to lower the risk of employees suffering harm for which it is ultimately going to be responsible. Indirect lowering of accident costs can occur, therefore, whenever the
party who controls the risk modifies its behavior in order to lower its exposure to the payment obligation.
One of the insights of the economic analysis of liability for
product-related harms has been the safety effect that can occur
even when the party in control of the risk lacks an economic
incentive to lower the risk. If the expected liability costs were
lower than the investment necessary to avoid the liability, the
party would be acting rationally, all else aside, in paying its
damages as they occur rather than changing its behavior to
avoid liability. In such a situation, however, the imposition of
legal responsibility for the harm suffered by the victims can
cause the price of the goods or services posing the risk to rise
above what it would be in the absence of a compensation responsibility. If the price increase depresses demand, then one would
expect fewer harms attributable to that risk to occur.
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The emphasis in that last statement is necessary to highlight
the limit on what is being claimed for the effect of an increased
price. It is not necessarily true that the net effect of lower demand for a risky product is a decrease in overall harm. 48 The
empirical question that needs to be answered is how will the
needs of the consumers who are priced away from the product
now be met. If the answer is that those consumers will now engage in riskier behavior, the final judgement about whether
there has been a net social safety gain will require a calculation
of the accident losses that are prevented by the consumers' reaction to the higher priced product and the accident losses that are
caused by the consumers' reaction to the higher priced product.
The fact that harms associated with alternative means of
satisfying consumer desire might increase does not necessarily
undercut the argument for attempting to obtain the safety gain
attributable to the price increase that is associated with an imposition of legal responsibility for the harm. The net effect may
still be positive in the sense that the harms attributable to whatever the consumers select as an alternative are more susceptible
to direct regulation, or are easier to accommodate within existing
legal and insurance regimes, or for some other reason pose less
of a social problem than the harms associated with the product
in question.
Two points about the relationship between an obligation to
compensate for harm and a predicted enhancement of safety
need to be kept in mind. First, the actual effects of an imposition
of legal responsibility for harm are likely to be complex and to
vary from setting to setting. Second, the fact that empirical questions need to be answered should not detract from raising the
hypothesis that the implementation of a new injury compensation system proposal can achieve a safety goal as well as provide

48. Professor Ausness refers to this as an example of the economic phenomenon
of the "second best." Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 423 (1997). The most obvious instance of this kind of effect
is when consumers are priced out of the market for a safer but more expensive product and choose as a substitute a product that is less expensive but more dangerous.
That does not seem to be a plausible scenario for tobacco products. A different way
in which the effect might occur, however, is that consumers change the manner of
use of the more expensive product so that the risk is magnified. For a discussion of
how smoker behavior might change in a way that enhances the riskiness, see LeBel,
Tobacco Deaths, at 639-40.
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compensation to those who are injured.

C. The Third Goal -Administrative Efficiency
Compensating for injury can require activity by a variety of
public and private institutions, each of which involves an expenditure of some resources- money, time, energy- to make the
two most critical determinations: whether a claimant is entitled
to compensation, and if so, what benefits should be paid. A goal
of administrative efficiency serves as a constraint on the achievement of compensatory and safety goals: soCiety as a whole is not
well served when the cost of administering a compensation system rises to a level that exceeds the compensation and safety
gains associated with the system. Efficiency may not be the most
important criterion with which to assess a compensation program, but accomplishments on other dimensions would have to
be extraordinarily important to justify a system that cost considerably more to administer than it provided in compensation and
safety. 49
,
The strongest lesson one can learn from the administrative
experience of injury compensation systems is the cost of precision. In the tort system, there is considerable momentum toward
increasingly refined allocations of responsibility. Under comparative negligence affirmative defenses, for example, fault must be
apportioned between plaintiffs and defendants. The fault shares
of parties, and in some cases non-parties as well, must be determined to apply a comparative fault contribution rule in a joint
and several liability setting. If joint and several liability is replaced, in whole or in part, with a proportional liability scheme,
the share of responsibility of each person who contributed to the
occurrence of the harm becomes even more critical to the determination of the extent to which a plaintiff will be compensated.
The precision sought in these comparative responsibility doctrines comes at a price. The decision making demand on the fact
finder becomes more complicated, and one might expect the presentation of evidence and arguments to be affected accordingly.

49. This is, of course, one of the more compelling arguments in the arsenal of the
critics of contemporary tort law, at least in such routine settings as the litigation of
responsibility for losses suffered in automobile accidents. See generally JEFFREY
O'CoNNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971).
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The risk of confusion and genuine error should rise as juries are
presented with more complex decision making tasks. The ability
of parties and their attorneys to predict outcomes would be another factor that is affected by the introduction of new variables
in the outcome. Although it is not clear that this would necessarily impede settlement, 50 it is likely to increase the uncertainty
in which settlement valuations of claims take place.
Simplifying the determinations that a compensation system
must make can reduce the cost of administering the system considerably. In the Agent Orange program, for example, virtually
all of the particularistic causation determinations were eliminated by the decision to treat the simple fact of exposure to the
herbicide in Vietnam as the initial threshold element. 51 Sophisticated medical and vocational determinations of the nature of
harm and the degree of disability can similarly be eliminated
with rough categorical decisions about harm and benefit
amounts. Issues that would appear to matter a great deal in the
normal human reaction to an incident, such as who was at fault,
might be pushed to the background or out of the picture altogether in a compensation system, as is true of the workers' com·
pensation system.
Along with the simplified determinations that can be built into
the threshold entitlement elements, a compensation system's
efficiency can be increased by adopting decision making processes that deviate from the intensive scrutiny associated with the
litigation model. Decisions can be made within an administrative
process that resembles claims processing· of the insurance industry more than it does the fact finding of civil litigation. To retain
the administrative efficiency gains obtained at that first level of
decision making, an injury compensation system can structure
the further review of those decisions to minimize the chance that
some later stage will reintroduce the trial-type process that was
avoided in the first instance.
While it is clear that the price of precision in making determinations can be lowered, the decision making efficiency itself co-

50. One can imagine, for example, that the complexity of the litigation decisions
increases the anticipated cost of litigating a claim, so that the expected return is
lowered, making settlement more attractive.
51. Harvey Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 53 (1990).
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mes at a cost that may be significant. An important part of the
motivation for the comparative responsibility movement in tort
law is a sense of fairness that is offended by asking only whether
or not questions without going on to ask how much questions as
well. The creators of an injury compensation system might anticipate the charge of unfairly refusing to make fine discriminations
among types of conduct and degrees of harm by making it clear
what is the central aim of the system, and then structuring the
delivery of benefits so that there is a strong correlation between
the process that is used and the aim that is sought.
One other feature of administrative efficiency needs to be
considered. The discussion so far has focused on the costs of
making decisions within the compensation system. The ·manner
in which the .compensation system is coordinated with other
systems and programs can have a significant effect on what the
society as a whole invests in the solution of the injury problem.
A desire to eliminate what appears to be wasteful expenditure of
judicial resources can help to justify the abolition of the collateral source rule in tort law, for example. Instead of quantifying
and determining responsibility for categories of harms that have
been covered by other sources, a legal system might conclude
that the best use of the civil justice system is to compensate for
harm for which there is no other coverage.
Injury compensation systems can address this issue in a number of ways, with two models at opposite ends of the spectrum.
The injury compensation system can be set up so that the entitlement to benefits is triggered only if other sources of compensation prove to be inadequate in a particular case. Under this model, the administrative costs of the compensation system would
only be incurred when absolutely essential to accomplish the
aims of the program. On the other hand, the injury compensation system can be established so that it is the compensation
source of first resort, allowing society to avoid expenditures of resources in the other arenas in which the effects of the harm
would have to be addressed. Compensation systems can thus be
structured so that they are supplemental or exclusive sources of ·
compensation.
What needs to be understood is that there are two sources of
justice concerns in creating an injury compensation system. An
appearance of diverting legitimate claims from a tort liability
regime where those claims would receive more generous treat-
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ment than they are given in the compensation system may seem
unfair to the claimant. An appearance of extracting funds from
entities who would bear no realistic exposure to tort liability
may seem unfair to the parties who contribute to the financing of
the compensation system. The most realistic prospects for an
injury compensation system arise when there is a convergence of
interests of the affected parties and the society as a whole, so
that a responsible compromise can be brokered to accommodate
the competing interests to the greatest extent feasible.
D. The Fourth Goal -Appropriate Cost Internalization

Interpalization of injury costs may initially strike an observer
more as a process by which other goals are achieved rather than
as an independent goal itself. It is certainly true that safety
effects, for example, can be traced to a decision that a particular
industry must take injury costs into account when it makes decisions about how much to invest in safety. A legal system that
imposes a compensation obligation on that industry uses the cost
internalization process to induce producers and consumers to act
in ways that promote greater safety.
·
Although the instrumental nature of cost internalization is
clear, there is nonetheless some additional analytical clarity that
can be achieved by focusing briefly on cost internalization as an
end in itself. The starting point for a cost internalization analysis is Guido Calabresi's question, ''What is a cost of what?"52
That question is a matter of causation, asking when we can identify one factor as a cause of another. In the realms of theology
and metaphysics, such an inquiry would look ultimately to first
causes53 and draw on quite subtle distinctions. 54 In the law of
injury compensation, fortunately, the causal answer that underlies an appropriate measure of cost internalization is obtainable
from a more concrete identification of burdens and benefits.
Achieving appropriate cost internalization as a goal for an
injury compensation system is actually the converse of Judge

52. See CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 133.
53. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 33 (1948 ed.) (Q. 2, art. 3: proof of
existence of God by reference to first efficient cause).
54. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, IN 2 COMPLETE WORKS 1552, 1555-57 (J. BARNES
ed. 1984) (distinctions among four senses of causation).
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Calabresi's prescription to avoid externalities. 55 The goal is to
create a rough correspondence between those who enjoy the benefits of an activity and those who bear the burdens. When the
activity is the manufacture or the distribution of a product that
has the capacity to injure, the appropriate focus is on whether
the losses associated with those injuries are included within the
costs of the industry distributing the product. If they are so internalized, then the price of the product will reflect the injury
costs as part of the social cost of the product, and production and
demand levels will be set accordingly. If they are not internalized, then production and demand levels for the product will be
inflated. Furthermore, in the absence of cost internalization, the
injury costs that are externalized onto the victims will have to be
borne by some segment of the population other than the producers and, through them, the full class of consumers of the product.
It is the absence of cost internalization, not its appropriate utilization, that leads to injury costs being spread across society as
a whole.
Within the contemporary law of products liability, even when
the liability that is being imposed is putatively strict, the defectiveness analysis specifically and deliberately narrows the benefits and burdens comparison. The focus is on the risk that the
product poses to the user or others and the benefits that the
product offers to the consumers and others exposed to the risk.
The overall economic benefit of the product is supposed to be
excluded from the analysis, as is the economic burden associated
with decreasing the availability or the affordability of the product. 56 It matters to that analysis, for example, whether people
who would benefit from an unavoidably risky prescription drug
are deprived of that benefit; it is not supposed to matter whether
the pharmaceutical industry must downsize its workforce as a
response to the exposure to products liability.
Approaching an injury problem through the vehicle of an injury compensation system provides room for thinking comprehensively and systemically about the overall social good that can be
accomplished through the program. Determinations that are in

55. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 144-50.
56. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986)
(improper to include social benefits from production of cigarettes as factor in
risk/utility analysis).
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the broader public interest may be easier to make in the course
of global solutions to problems than they are in the more piecemeal fashion of the adjudicatory process. Those who inquire
about the effect of liability on the farm economies of tobacco
growing states or the industrial economies of cigarette manufacturing states are met with indifference in the liability theories of
tort law. Such concerns are legitimately incorporated into a consideration of the optimal social solution to a widespread social
problem.

E. The Essential Elements of an Injury Compensation System
As the preceding discussion of the goals of an injury compensation system suggests, the emerging law of injury compensation
systems draws on a variety of statutory and regulatory enactments and common law precedent, dealing with a wide range of
substantive, procedural and remedial issues. Although one might
be tempted to abandon an attempt to systematize and synthesize
such a hodge-podge of programs, that temptation can be resisted
if one keeps focused on a core of five major issues that the study
or the creation of any injury compensation system will be required to address. 57

i. The defining issue for an injury compensation system is what
is the basis of entitlement to compensation.
The entitlement to compensation sets the parameters for the
system. More than any other element of a compensation program, the basis of entitlement captures the essential aim of the
program and defines how much fle.xibility there is likely to be in
the construction of the other elements of the program.
The basic question at the heart of an injury compensation program is the identification of the injury compensation problem.
The creation of a system requires careful thought about the nature of the problem, and of how it is possible to address it in this
57. AB is true of statements of the goals of an injury compensation system, different commentators might choose among various terms for the essential issues that
need to be addressed. In a recently published proposal for a compensation program
in the contaminated blood products setting, Professor Andrew Klein has identified the
major components of the program as jurisdiction, funding, compensation, and access
to the tort system. Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability
in Blood Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107 (1995).
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manner. Is the problem that too many harms are occurring? Is
the problem that too many injured parties are being left to their
own devices to deal with the consequences of the harm? Is the
problem that the litigation system reaches too many results
thought to be socially undesirable? Is the problem that the litigation system reaches generally appropriate results but at an unacceptable cost? Is the problem the lack of a prospective focus, so
that the injury compensation system could be seen as trying to
get ahead of the curve of a massive number of claims instead of
playing catch-up in the way that the tort litigation system generally does? The shape of the program will be responsive to the
answers to these different questions.
Compensation programs can be set up so that they resemble
the zero-based proof attitude of the litigation system, in which
the decision maker begins with a clean slate and nothing happens until the claimant satisfies an evidentiary burden that is
fact specific to the claim. Much of the attractiveness of the compensation system approach lies in the ability to make appropriate decisions without a high investment in fact finding, and in
order to realize that attraction, the entitlement to compensation
would have to be set in a more categorical way. Presumptions of
entitlement built into the system from the start are a quite useful way of streamlining the process, 58 as are predetermined levels of benefits for particular showings of harm. 59

ii. Once the threshold for obtaining compensation has been
determined, the next issue that needs to be addressed is what is
the compensation that the system will provide to those who cross
that threshold.
Given the genesis of many injury compensation systems in
particular dissatisfactions with the tort system in place at the
time the system is created, it is not surprising that the questions
58. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994) (Vaccine I~Uury Table containing conditions and time of onset to· qualify as a vaccine-related injury for purposes of compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine I!Uury Compensation Act).
59. The intermediate group of claimants in the Dalkon Shield compensation program, those with proof of the use of the device and medical evidence of their conditions but who faced problems with alternative causes of their conditions, were compensated according to a schedule resembling a workers' compensation schedule for
loss of body parts. RONALD J. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON
SmELD BANKRUPTCY 313 (1991).
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at this stage of system creation tend to turn on how closely the
compensation will correspond to the damages that would be
available if the claimant were successful in a tort action.
The basic choices to be made on this element of the system
involve different sets of variables. One of the variables is the
level of compensation: should the system attempt to provide total
compensation or should there instead be an acknowledgment
that the compensation is only partial. Another variable is the
position that the compensation system occupies in the universe
of potential sources of compensation: is the system the payor of
first resort or is it instead a compensation source that comes into
operation only for otherwise uncompensated harm. Related to
that variable is the choice of whether to extinguish other claims
that may arise out of the incident or exposure giving rise to the
harm or to allow tort actions to proceed against those who occupy a third party status to the relationship between the injury
victim and the enterprise that is held responsible through the
compensation program.
The interaction between those sets of variables can help to
shape the program. •The availability of, and the likelihood of
success on, third party claims can relieve some of the financial
pressure on the compensation system, for example, which can in
turn affect the level of benefits that can be afforded for those
who do not have access to a third party recovery. Similarly, a
decision to make the program a supplemental source of compensation can affect the demands that are placed on the funds that
are available, opening up further possibilities for deciding what
harm is compensable in what amounts.
If the claimant is given options of accepting the award made
within the compensation system or pursuing a tort remedy, then
the compensation that is available within the system has to be
generous enough to provide an incentive to accept the system's
award. That generosity is, of course, less needed as the prospect
of success in the tort litigation declines.

iii. Given the basis and the nature of compensation, the creators
of an injury compensation system must decide what is the source
of the funds for compensation.
The workers' compensation system employs a variety of techniques for assuring adequate funding for claims for compensa-
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tion. Some states create funding bodies from which compensation
is paid, but the predominant mode of financing workers' compensation benefits is insurance obtained on the commercial market
or, in the case of the more financially sound entities, self-insurance. When the decisions about compensation make the system
resemble a social welfare benefit more than a liability determination, it is probably best to see the source of funds as a tax on
the enterprise that has produced the harm.
The appropriate taxing unit is a decision that has to be made
in the construction of a compensation program. Childhood vaccines, for example, are taxed on each dose produced by the pharmaceutical industry, but the tax rate varies among the vaccines
according to the risk of injury associated with each vaccine. 60 If
the risk is generally uniform across the enterprise that is being
held responsible for financing the program, then the cost of administration of the system can be kept lower due to the absence
of a need to make differential risk determinations affecting the
financial obligations of individual contributors to the funding of
the program. At the outset of a program where the risk variation
is a matter of uncertainty, cost effectiveness in administration
may call for an initial uniform assessment, with an on-going and
periodic review process to determine whether the rate should be
changed to reflect actual claims experience.

iv. An injury compensation system must address the question of
what procedures are to be used for making the two critical
determinations: whether compensation should be awarded, and if
so, how much compensation an individual claimant should
receive.
One of the major advantages of an injury compensation system
is the opportunity to lower the costs of making the critical determinations of whether and how much compensation should be
awarded. Although some states direct contested workers' compensation cases to the trial court of general jurisdiction, it is
more common to find the first level of decisions made by administrative agencies, with subsequent judicial review in a trial
court or, more commonly, directly to an appellate court. Compen-

60. 26 U.S.C. § 4131 (1994) (tax on vaccines, the revenues of which are appropriated into the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund under 26 U.S.C. § 9510).
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sation programs may set up special administrative bodies to
make the decisions, as was the case with the Dalkon Shield
Claimants' Trust. 61 The creation of a new compensation program may involve subcontracting the decision making to an
outside body, as in the Agent Orange experience, 62 which might
seem a particularly attractive option when the decisions are
essentially insurance payment matters rather than complicated
or contestable factual determinations. Decisions can also be
made within a currently existing judicial structure, as with the
special masters of the Court of Federal Claims63 or within the
bankruptcy proces·s in the federal district courts.

v. Finally, an injury compensation system must contain a clear
process for determining how the compensation provided within
the system is to be coordinated with the tort system and with
collateral sources of compensation for the harm covered by the
system.
The options on this component of an injury compensation
system include three basic models. Drawing on the experience
with workers' compensation systems, the benefits available under the new system can be considered the exclusive remedy that
is available to the injured person. The federal vaccine injury program employs a model of election following exhaustion; the injured person is required to proceed into the compensation program, but at its termination, the claimant is entitled to reject
the result obtained within the system and pursue a tort remedy,
albeit under a tort regime that is altered by substantive and procedural requirements set out in the legislation. The new compensation system might also be seen as a supplement to the existing
· tort liability system, stepping in to provide compensation for
those who are not compensated or who are undercompensated
under the prevailing doctrines of tort law. 64
61. Vairo, supra note 40, at 630-31.
62. Berman, supra note 51.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1994) (conferring jurisdiction on Court of Federal
Claims to determine entitlement and amount of compensation under the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
64. Professor Eades' commentary suggests that the compensation program funded
by a tax on tobacco products, along with regulatory efforts, "should be merely an
adjunct to the traditional tort system." Eades, supra note 8, at 495. In an earlier
effort to construct a system for compensating victims of drunk drivers, the author
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II. SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE CONTOURS OF
AN INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR TOBACCORELATED HARMS

Taking the general observations of the preceding section about
the genesis of injury compensation systems and applying them to
the situation we find when we examine the current legal posture
of the tobacco industry in this country raises more questions
than it provides answers. Approaching the issue in a systematic
way and at a systemic level should, however, offer some instruction about what are - and perhaps even more importantly, what
are not - useful avenues to pursue.
When one considers the goals of an injury compensation system, some are easier to achieve in a tobacco setting than others.
At first glance, compensation would appear to be considerably
more difficult to accomplish than would the achievement of the
goals of reducing the risk of harm and of forcing the industry to
internalize the costs of tobacco-related harms into the industry's
operating expense. Containing within manageable levels the
administrative expenses of any program established to provide
those benefits is also problematic in any system that would attempt to provide a counterpart to tort damages for individual
victims of tobacco-related harms.
Compensation of tobacco product users for their individual
harm is difficult to reconcile with tobacco-related harms on both
a conceptual and a practical level. One of the more distinctive
features of tobacco-related harms is that the bulk of those harms
occur to the people who voluntarily begin to use the products
which, at least for some time now, have been accompanied by
warnings of the risks that these harms will occur. In this sense,
then, much of the harm that tobacco causes cannot be characterized as occurring to people who. fit the traditional understanding
of "innocent victims." This aspect of the problem raises two possibilities, in the sense that there are two different routes we might
follow.
The first possible response is that a compensation system
needs to be devised in such a way as to exclude from access to

chose this option. LEBEL, supra note 20, at 290-92. On reflection, it is not clear that
the same choice would be made by the author even in that setting today, given legit·
imate concerns about duplication of decision making tasks and the resultant higher
costs of administration, compared to an exclusivity model.
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the compensation provided by the system the "willing participants" in the risky behavior that leads to the harm. Such a response is deeply embedded in traditional tort ways of thinking
about injury compensation. The defense of assumption of risk
raised a total bar to recovery for more than a century of our
experience with fault-based jurisprudence. In the pockets of
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, assumption of
the risk that made the activity abnormally dangerous has remained a defense. As a strict tort liability theory emerged for
products cases, the product user's unreasonable decision to use
the product knowing of the defective condition was retained as
an affirmative defense. 65
A reluctance to expend limited resources on those who knowingly encounter a risk for no good reason is responsive to a fundamental notion of personal responsibility. Indeed, in an earlier
work on compensating the victims of intoxicated drivers, the
author specifically excluded from. a new compensation system
proposal any possibility of recovery by the drinking drivers or
those whose claims were derived from the drinking drivers. 66
That kind of restriction in the tobacco setting would not necessarily leave the system with nothing to do. Passive smoking
victims who are injured by environmental tobacco sinoke would
constitute a presumably large class of persons who fit the profile
of classic innocent victims.
It would thus be possible to design a system that excluded
claims for compensation by the users of tobacco products. The
question then becomes whether we should do that, or whether
instead there is something about the tobacco injury context that
undermines this initial reluctance to include product users within the class of those who are entitled to compensation of some
sort. The possibility of finding that contextual peculiarity is
heightened if we consider the second response to the issue of
whether smokers should be treated as willing participants rather
than as innocent victims.
The second and different response to the characterization
question is that the moral responsibility for the adverse effects
on the nation's health is so widely disproportionate when one
considers the tobacco industry and the users of its products that
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
66. LEBEL, supra note 20, at 297-99.
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any qualms that we might have about rewarding people for their
bad behavior should be set aside. It is one thing for society to
view with special disfavor a driver who chooses to become intoxicated and then exposes himself and others to the enhanced risk
of death on the highway. It is quite another thing for society to
view with the same level of disapproval people who succumb to
the sophisticated marketing efforts that result in the addiction of
the youngest segment of the consuming population to the products whose full risks are unlikely to be conveyed by the manufacturers or appreciated by the consumers at the critical and vulnerable age when lifestyle choices are being made. The bipolar
world of willing participants and innocent victims fails to capture
the reality of a consuming population who became addicted at a
time when in every way except for the government-mandated
warnings the industry downplayed and denied the health risk.
Support for a response that is more tolerant of the choices
initially made by those who are injured can be found both in
contemporary tort law and in the experience of other compensation systems that have been developed as alternatives to tort
litigation. One of the most widely adopted modifications in tort
doctrine in recent years has been the shift in the treatment of
plaintiffs' conduct defenses from total bars to recovery to bases
for comparative reductions in the arn,ount of recovery. A frequently adopted corollary to the comparative negligence doctrine
has been the limitation of the assumption of risk defense to
those situations in which the decision to encounter the known
risk was unreasonable, viewed in objective terms. Within
workers' compensation, the injury compensation system with
which we have the longest experience, it has long been the case
that only the most egregious fault on the part of the injured
employee would act as a barrier to a full entitlement to the benefits of the compensation system.
The experience of opening access to compensation for those
whose fault has contributed to their harm would be a stronger
precedent to follow if other goals would be accomplished by doing
so, and if the most problematic forms of compensation were adequately addressed. When one looks at those other goals in the
tobacco setting, the grounds of support for expanding the range
of compensation to include some of the harms suffered by tobacco
product users become apparent.
Achieving an appropriate measure of cost internalization in
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the tobacco setting is a goal that is going to be met in the near
future only if there are litigation breakthroughs of one sort or
another, or if a specially tailored program is adopted to shift
some of the costs of those harms to the industry. With very few
exceptions, the harms attributable to the use of tobacco products
have been successfully externalized by the industry that manufactures and distributes those products. A curious feature of the
contemporary tobacco litigation scene is that significant costs are
being internalized by the industry, but those sums in the tens (or
hundreds 67 ) of millions of dollars are the costs of defending
against any legal responsibility for the harm that the products
have caused. Acknowledging that responsibility and then participating in an appropriately designed compensation system
would divert that socially wasteful expenditure into channels
that would actually accomplish some public good.
A compensation program that was limited to environmental
tobacco smoke victims would be the easiest to justify on cost
internalization grounds. For those harms of smoking, the burdens of dealing with the consequences of the product's use are
visited on a segment of the population that enjoy none of the
benefits of that use. Shifting the costs of their harms to the industry would be in accord with the classical restorative justice
notions embodied in contemporary economic ideas of matching
benefits and burdens through cost internalization mechanisms of
private and public law.
An injury compensation system that reached more broadly so
that the harms of product users who in some sense share the
responsibility for their health-impaired condition could be compensated also has analogical support on cost internalization
grounds. In the workers' compensation setting, for instance,
careless workers and their resultant injuries are seen as an
inevitable incident of the employment enterprise, and the costs
of those injuries are thought to be appropriately incorporated
into the operating costs of the employing enterprise and then
into the prices paid for the goods and services of that enterprise.
A quite similar line of thinking would be applicable to a tobacco injury compensation system that included product users
among its beneficiaries. Smoking-related harms are the most
67. In a discussion following the presentation of the papers at this Symposium,
the figure of $600 million dollars in defense costs annually was mentioned.
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predictable, indeed certain, of the consequences of distributing
cigarettes, and a legal system that allowed the industry to continue to externalize the costs of those harms would allow the
industry to understate its costs of operation significantly.
Because those costs have to be allocated somewhere, treating
them as matters for the tobacco industry to internalize would
relieve the financial burden on some other sources of public and
private compensation. Including smokers as persons whose
harms were included within the scope of a tobacco injury compensation system would make explicit what is implicit in the
compensation provided to injured consumers through products
liability litigation. Part of the price of the product reflects access
to a system for shifti.ng accident costs away from the victim and
for spreading those costs over a different base than the one that
would bear the costs if they were not shifted. Automobiles, for
example, are marginally more expensive because a potential
recovery of damages for harm caused by defective automobiles is
part of the package obtained by the purchaser. Likewise tobacco
products could be priced at a level that reflects the opportunity
for those harmed by the products to recover some of the costs of
those harms.
Cost internalization in this sense is appropriately seen as a
form of insurance, albeit one that operates more as a tax than a
voluntary decision to purchase coverage in the commercial insurance market. 68 Two questions follow from that understanding,
however. First, is the cost being internalized by the appropriate
enterprise? Second, is the system by which compensation is provided the most appropriate method for delivering the compensation? Each of those questions is answered in large part by
considering in the tobacco setting the remaining goals of an
injury compensation system. The risk reduction objective points
strongly toward the tobacco industry as an appropriate institution on which to impose some of the costs of the harm caused by
tobacco products, while the administrative efficiency goal is best
served by a compensation system that is financed through a

68. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 486 n.251 (1993) (''To the extent
that the [loss] spreading mechanism [of products liability] extracts premiums from
persons involuntarily, its funding mechanism should be considered a form of taxation.").
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specially earmarked tax on tobacco products that is used to address a limited segment of the financial consequences of tobaccorelated harms.
The safety enhancement goal for a compensation system in the
tobacco setting is more readily achievable than virtually any
other objective. An increase in the cost of the tobacco product is
likely to produce a corresponding decrease in demand, particularly among the younger users who are at the critical age when
they are most likely to become addicted long-term users. What-:
ever method is used to force the industry to internalize the costs
of the harm that their products cause will almost certainly have
as a beneficial effect a reduction in the volume of those harms.
This exercise in thinking through the options for an injury
compensation system grew out of a set of reflections on the rapidly changing legal posture of the tobacco industry in the summer of 1996. 69 The most promising of the developments surveyed in that article was a surtax on tobacco products enacted
through voter referendum in three states. 70 The revenues from
that supplemental excise tax were earmarked for special programs that would lower the cost of tobacco harms, both by supporting efforts to lower the smoking rate and by subsidizing
measures to treat people with smoking-related health problems.
That kind of tax increase supporting particular programs is an
eminently defensible piece of social policy. It accomplishes some
shifting of injury costs to the industry that has, for the most
part, successfully externalized those costs, and it does so in a
way that may increase the price to reflect its social cost more
than is currently the case. The lesson that emerges from the
economic analysis of injury compensation is that the tax increase
itself is likely to produce a beneficial effect if demand for the
products declines. The search for an appropriate compensation
program begins from that point, but it remains the most powerful justification for addressing the tobacco injury problem
through a vehicle outside of the traditional tort litigation system.
Administrative efficiency, if not viewed as a fully independent
goal, at least serves as an important side constraint on the methods that are used to achieve other ends. In the tobacco setting,
69. LeBel, supra note 1.
70. The state referenda were passed in California in 1988, in Massachusetts in
1992, and in Arizona in 1994. See id. at 635-47.
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the foundation for collecting the funds for an effective compensation program is already in place, in the form of the excise tax
structure that is imposed on tobacco products by the federal and
state governments. Distribution of funds to those harmed by the
products is more problematic, largely because the phenomenal
marketing success enjoyed by the industry has made the occurrence of those harms quite widespread.
Administrative efficiency notions play a role in making the
centrally shaping decision of whether an injury compensation
system in the tobacco setting should exclude claims by those who
use the products. The effects of consumption of tobacco products
are not signature diseases in the sense that asbestosis is uniquely attributable to exposure to asbestos fibers. 71 What that
means is that a smoker who presents a particular health problem may have multiple factors in his or her personal history and
the environment that arguably contribute to that problem.
The multiplicity of causal factors could lead to a decision to
exclude smokers from access to the compensation program for
tobacco-related harms in the absence of a showing of predominance of smoking as a causal explanation of the claimant's condition. Such a decision would, however, understate the complicity
of the tobacco industry in the health risk that its product users
face. More promising as a source of guidance in this setting is
the experience in the workers' compensation setting of attributing responsibility and thus opening access to the program as
long as there is a minimal showing that the relevant factor (in
this case it would be the use of the tobacco products rather than
the occupational exposure to harmful substances) was a significant contributing factor to the claimant's current condition. 72
Drawing on those functional considerations, and appreciating
the tensions between and among various goals in the tobaccorelated harm setting, a tentative shape for a tobacco injury com-

71. At least not yet. One of the evidentiary issues in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) was whether the
kind of cancer that the plaintiff suffered was consistent with exposure to the tobacco
smoke byproducts. Medical science may become capable of specifically linking tobacco
use and particular cancers in the future.
72. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 301 S.E.2d 359 (N.C. 1983) (occupational
disease established if claimant shows that workplace exposure to cotton dust significantly contributed to the development of the disease; exposure does not have to be
sole cause of disease).
·
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pensation program begins to emerge. The remainder of this section of the article will sketch the major elements of this initial
approach to constructing an injury compensation system in this
complex and politically charged environment.
The most realistic and manageable method of establishing a
basis of entitlement to benefits from a tobacco injury compensation program would be for the creator of the program to construct a schedule of harms comparable to the Vaccine Injury
Table in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation
Act. 73 In that legislation, Congress established a list of conditions related to each of the vaccines covered by the Act, with a
time within which each condition would normally be expected to
occur if it were in fact vaccine related. The occurrence of the first
onset or a substantial aggravation of one of the Table conditions
within the period specified in the Table creates a presumption
that the victim is entitled to compensation under the Act. 74 In
the absence of the presumption from the Vaccine Injury Table,
the claimant bears the burden of proving that he or she has
suffered a vaccine-related injury. 75
No one would suggest that the task of creating such a tobacco
harm schedule is anything but breathtakingly complex, but it is
perhaps the most critical preliminary step in fashioning a system
that is manageable and affordable. The experience in administering the Black Lung Act suggests that time and energy invested
in setting the right threshold at the outset would be more than
repaid in the avoidance of subsequent difficulties in determining
access to compensation in a way that does riot convert the system into a general health insurance program. 76
Once a working definition of tobacco harm is accomplished
through the construction of a tobacco harm schedule, the question becomes what is to be done with what has been identified as
tobacco-related harm. Monetary payments made to individuals
seem to be the least justifiable use of the funds that would become available in a tobacco injury compensation program. The
maximum attainment of the multiple goals of the system would
.

.

73. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-ll(c)(l)(C)(i) (1994).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-ll(c)(l)(C)(ii) (1994).
76. See PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION
FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1987).
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be best achieved if the benefits were instead used to supplement
the privately and publicly financed health care resources available to the population at large. Drawing on but expanding the
theory underlying the claims by the state attorneys general, that
the use of tobacco products has produced a health care cost that
is being subsidized by various segments of the population, the
compensation from this program could be provided in the categories which follow.
A. For victims who suffer harms on the tobacco harm schedule and

who are covered by health insurance, benefits would be provided to
reimburse the victim for the difference between the actual cost of the
health care for those harms and the insurance coverage that is
·
available to the individual.

This benefit of the compensation program would generally fall
into two categories. For individuals whose insurance coverage
has not been exhausted, the compensation would be in the
amounts of the deductibles or co-payments required for the
health care. These benefits would be available both for privately
insured individuals and for those who are covered by Medicare.
For those individuals whose health care has exhausted the major
medical provisions of their insurance, the compensation would be
in the amount of the health care expenditures, in the same way
that uninsured individuals would be compensated below.
B. For uninsured victims of harms on the tobacco harm schedule,
benefits would take the form of payments to the health care
providers who perform care for those harms.

For this category of benefits, the program would act as a substitute for the Medicaid agency within the state where the care
is provided. Instead of treating the health care as a public expense, the injury compensation system would treat it as an expense attributable to the tobacco industry to be funded through
the compensation program. Payments would be made to the
providers, not to the victims, and the payments would be made
for the services as they are provided, eliminating any need to
determine a lump-sum amount for future medical expenses.
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C. For tobacco-related deaths, as determined according to the
tobacco harm schedule, a death benefit of a modest amount would
be payable to the estate of the decedent.

The purpose of this form of payment is largely symbolic, but
experience in the law of injury compensation systems has suggested that symbolic payments can produce a beneficial effect. 77
The most important social fact about tobacco products is that
when used in their intended ways, they produce disabling and
fatal conditions. The sort of "terminal benefit" contemplated in
this provision of the tobacco injury compensation program acknowledges the role that tobacco products play in the pathology
of the American public.
As an incidental positive effect; the death benefit undercuts
the curious argument that tobacco deaths actually produce a
public good in the form of deaths that lower the long-term health
care costs of people who would live longer were it not for their
tobacco-related harm. Tobacco deaths themselves would become
part of the cost of the product that the industry would be required to internalize, not some sort of perverse public benefit
that the industry is providing to the nation.
Missing from this list of items that would be compensated by
. the tobacco injury compensation program is any payment to the
tobacco victim for two items of loss: those that are pecuniary in
nature but covered by some other funding source, and those that
are non-pecuniary in nature. For smokers, such an exclusion
could be justified on the ground previously raised, namely, that
there are limited funds with which to try to accomplish a set of
objectives and the lowest priority claim on those funds is the
compensation of those who participated in the production of their
harm.
For non-smokers, a different justification would have to be
sought. Their participation in the harm is involuntary in all but
the most formalistic way. It would be exceedingly harsh, for
example, to hold that flight attendants chose to be exposed to

77. In his fairness opinion in the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein used
quotes from Frazer's The Golden Bough and from Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address in support of the proposition that public acknowledgement could be as
significant as private compensation in the process of reaching closure of mass injury
claims. In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 857, 862
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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concentrated environmental tobacco smoke as part of their employment, and that they could always have elected other work if
they really objected to the exposure.
If there is to be any accommodation by the compensation program of claims for benefits that compensate for personal injury
as such, it would be in the context of claims by non-smokers who
have been harmed by exposure to the smoke from other people's
use of cigarettes. Within an injury compensation system, those
claims would present difficult scientific issues about causation,
at least in the short run. That suggests that, again perhaps only
in the short run, the appropriate view of the injury compensation
system for this class of claimants is as a limited supplement to
the other sources of compensation, rather than as a substitute
for the wider range and larger size of the awards that might be
obtainable in a tort recovery.
Financing the compensation system for tobacco-related harms
is easily accomplished through a tax on tobacco products, with
the revenue earmarked for this purpose. AB described in a recent
publication, such a tax would have two positive effects in the
tobacco setting. 78 First, it would generate funds to support the
compensatory aim of the proposal, with an expectation that the
drain on other sources of funding for those same purposes could
be lightened. Second, it would increase the price of the tobacco
products so that the market signals receivedby consumers would
at least somewhat more closely correspond to the actual social
cost of those products, with whatever beneficial health effect
such a rise in price might produce in the form of a lower demand
for the products.
III. CONCLUSION

The description of these remarks as "preliminary thoughts" is
accurate for two reasons. First, there is a good deal to be done,
especially in the empirical and epidemiological fields, before the
next step of actually crafting a compensation program would be
feasible. But second, and more importantly, this is an attempt to
lower the rhetorical and economic stakes in the debate about
what to do when we know as much as we now know about the
risk of injury and death from the use of tobacco products. It

78. LeBel, supra note 1, at 638-41.
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ought not be a vain hope that once we have moved beyond the
name calling and the finger pointing, we can enter into a conversation about how to play an endgame that has at its core the
interest of the public as a whole rather than just the self-interest
of the various parties who are most directly affected by the outcome. Serious consideration of an injury compensation system as
an alternative to the tort litigation model could be a step in that
direction.

